President Kennedy's handwritten note from the Cuban Missile Crisis reads "hard information; John McCone; Sunday, October 14th; 5 days; week or ten days; medium range ballistic; 12 intermediate range ballistic missiles; draw line.
An expert on civil defense explained to them that 92 million Americans were vulnerable and that protective shelter was available for only 40 million.But on the other hand there wasn't any choice. Lundahl then introduces Sidney Graybeal "our missile man" who shows the president photos of similar weapons systems taken during Soviet military parades. Any delay or advance notice of military action, they pointed out, would allow the Russians to speed up construction of the missile bases, or move the missiles to more secure positions. At the end of the Tuesday session, the president states that the group should consider the various proposed responses to the situation, adding that photo reconnaissance flights should continue and that preparations for strikes against the missile installations should continue since "that's what we're going to do anyway. Khrushchev cabled Kennedy that he was prepared to remove missiles from Cuba in return for a US promise not to invade Cuba - a promise that had already been given more than once. The reason was that, for Kennedy, the crisis was not centrally about missiles in Cuba; it was about Berlin. The President also invited several other key advisors to join the group: C Douglas Dillon, who had held high posts under Eisenhower and who gave Kennedy a link to the Republican leadership; Dean Acheson and Robert Lovett, who had served under President Harry Truman and could help Kennedy see the current crisis in longer historical perspective; and a former ambassador to the Soviet Union, Llewellyn Tommy Thompson, probably the person in the President's circle who was best acquainted with Khrushchev. Who said [unclear]?
In the next few days, one harrowing moment followed another. Eventually, Kennedy resolves to send Khrushchev a public message calling for the dismantlement of the missiles in exchange for a no-invasion pledge, and a private message indicating that a deal on the Turkish missiles can be hammered out in the future.
Vice-President Lyndon Johnson worried aloud about these. Others joined the chiefs of staff in insisting that an attack should also take out air defence sites and bombers, so as to limit losses of US aircraft and prevent an immediate air reprisal against US bases in Florida.Kennedy, Bundy, and some others spoke of a 'surgical strike' solely against the missile sites. McNamara acknowledged that the submarine commander might think he was being attacked rather than being sent a signal and might fire at the destroyer. Because Khrushchev had been faced down, he did not force a new Berlin crisis. The president then questions the Soviet motive for establishing the missile sites, with subsequent comments from McNamara and then Taylor. After an unidentified speaker mentions that a blockade might buy some time, the president again asserts that Khrushchev will "grab Berlin" over missiles that do not even threaten the NATO allies. Top Finessing the Turkish missiles issue On October, the crisis came to a head. Delay would also give Khrushchev the chance to solidify his public commitment to Fidel Castro, making any showdown over Cuba that much more dangerous. But given how events did turn out, the aptly titled ''Kennedy Tapes'' stands as a lasting testament to one man's judgment and character. It is not conduct that one expects of the United States. For him, such a showdown would create a horrible dilemma. Kennediy, McGeorge Bundy, C. Top Quarantine In the first day's debates, everyone favoured bombing Cuba. The president is most concerned with the reaction of the Turks to which McNamara responds. The clip ends with the president asking how many missiles are in Turkey. At times fascinating; at other times, dry and tedious; this is an unprecedented view of the crisis and the Kennedy administration.
Top Quarantine In the first day's debates, everyone favoured bombing Cuba. At the urging of McNamara and the chiefs of staff, Kennedy authorised low-level daytime surveillance flights in addition to continuing U-2 flights.
You'd be.Worst of all, Khrushchev appears to have retracted his offer of the night before. The possibility of nuclear holocaust concentrated their minds wonderfully. His eyes were tense, almost grey, and we just stared at each other across the table. He had to insist that Soviet missiles come out of Cuba unconditionally, or he would compromise the display of firmness that he judged necessary to protect against a Berlin crisis. Kennedy had asked for advice about this from only a handful of people - those he knew he was officially obliged to consult. Thursday, October 18, P. They'd think up some other step that wasn't necessary. Top Quarantine In the first day's debates, everyone favoured bombing Cuba. The president then asks Lundahl several questions about the images. It frightens me to If you thought America acted alone and independently of every other nation during the Cuban Missile Crisis, you might be surprised by what's in this book. Remember, I told you that. But now, the fact is, you couldn't have done any less. Anyway, the sickening thing that's so very bad is what this revealed about. Kennedy, Bundy, and some others spoke of a 'surgical strike' solely against the missile sites. This plan works.
To those of Kennedy's advisers who still favoured quick use of military force the 'hawks' in later classificationthis quarantine constituted an ultimatum. Later in the same meeting the president sums up the military options. In other words, we need to really show them where we are now, because we need to have two things ready: a government for Cuba, because we're going to need one--we go in with bombing aircraft; and, secondly, plans for how to respond to the Soviet Union in Europe, because sure as hell they're going to do something there.
With Ball in the lead, Kennedy's advisers said almost unanimously that Khrushchev's new condition was unacceptable.