Is there free will? Think of what it would be like if your body never responded to what your conscious mind wished. In essence, that data must cross a barrier between two distinct realms: spirit-mind: conscious perception of hissing snake ——————————barrier————————— physical brain: biochemical data of hissing snake Consider next what is involved with my bodily movements when I turn and run.
A second version of interactive dualism is that God shuttles information back and forth between my physical brain and spirit-mind, a view defended by French philosopher Nicholas Malebranche This view is not particularly controversial, and even Elektro exhibited some sort of weak artificial intelligence.
The test essentially follows the old adage that, if it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, then it is a duck. Such authors pretend to think that consciousness exists, but in fact they end up denying its existence.Consciousness as intrinsic to the brain Another central aspect of Searle's analysis of the mind is his distinction between those attributes of an entity which are intrinsic, and those which are "observer-relative". Much of the modern discussion of the mind-body problem focuses on this issue. From these two viewpoints, I will have two incompatible lists of attributes, based on the three features of mental experience that we noted earlier: Mental Experience of Watching a Sunset I privately experience it It is not localizable in space It is about something Brain Activity Triggered by Watching a Sunset It is publicly observable It is localizable in space It is not about something As indicated on the above list, my mental experience of the sunset is a private experience within my own consciousness. Ontology and causation I believe the basic problem, at the root of this omission, is in Searle's false separation of ontology from causation. Searle does an excellent job of identifying the false premises at the bottom of most of today's theories in philosophy of mind. They are fitted to each other in virtue of the pre-established harmony between all substances since they are all representations of one and the same universe. We can't make the same claim for a computer program, because we are not computer programs -- but because we don't expect to be able to observe the consciousness of others this doesn't prove that the execution of a computer program cannot generate intentional mental processes in the computer. Am I experiencing 2-J love, 4-B love, or one of a dozen others? Is there free will? Only I have access to them, and outsiders cannot penetrate into my mind's concealed regions. This runs contrary to my natural conviction that my conscious mind has at least some control over how my body speaks and behaves. Some defenders of eliminative materialism seem to suggest that we are not really conscious at all, or that some major aspects of our alleged conscious mental states do not actually exist. Rand identifies consciousness as a philosophical axiom, implicit in all facts and not reducible to any other facts. On the one hand, you have the visual and emotional experience to what you are viewing.
I hand you a bag of potato chips, and I see how you respond. Leibniz writes, The soul follows its own laws, and the body likewise follows its own laws.